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Digital	labour	markets:	The	hard	questions
They	have	potentially	positive	and	negative	effects;	it’s	important	to	debunk	some	of	the	hype	and
rhetoric,	writes	Cristiano	Codagnone.
In	1770	Wolfgang	von	Kempelen	presented	a	sort	of	robot	called	the	Turk	(hidden	inside	there
was,	in	reality,	a	person	operating	it)	that	could	beat	humans	at	playing	chess.	The	robot	toured
Europe,	eliciting	contrasting	reactions	about	the	future	robotisation.	The	first	digital	labour	market
for	the	trading	of	micro-tasks	was	tellingly	named	Amazon	Mechanical	Turk	and	presented	as	a
new	form	of	‘artificial	intelligence’	based	on	the	principle	of	‘humans-as-a-service’.
In	the	past	three	decades	or	so	each	new	wave	of	digital	innovation	has	aroused	debates	and	contrasting
narrative	and	rhetoric	about	the	future	of	work.	The	emergence	of	digital	labour	markets,	in	which	labour-intensive
tasks	are	traded	through	platforms	that	match	requesters	(employers	and/or	consumers)	with	providers	(workers),
is	no	exception.
Proponents	see	digital	labour	markets	as	a	further	driver	toward	the	advent	of	a	‘Flat	World’	and	an	online	global
meritocracy;	as	a	means	to	empower	individuals	allowing	them	to	work	flexibly	or	make	extra	money	(especially
‘flexers’	such	as	stay-at-home	parents,	retirees,	students)	and	for	firms	to	efficiently	deal	with	work	picks.
Detractors	see	digital	markets	as	a	new	and	unregulated	channel	for	exploitation	by	employers	and	labour	cost-
saving;	they	argue	that	the	‘gigs’	traded	on	these	markets	are	the	components	of	formerly	full-time	jobs,	parcelled
up	and	put	out	to	tender	on	a	piece-by-piece	basis	to	increase	outsourcing	across	the	board.	In	a	critical	review
essay,	based	on	several	hundreds	of	secondary	sources	and	on	the	review	of	dozens	of	digital	labour	markets,
we	have	attempted	to	disentangle	the	rhetoric	with	available	empirical	evidence.
Digital	labour	markets	take	different	forms	depending	on	whether	they	allow	the	remote	delivery	of	electronically
transmittable	services	(i.e.	Amazon	Mechanical	Turk,	Upwork,	Freelancers,	etc.)	or	rather	the	matching	and
administration	processes	are	digital	but	the	delivery	of	the	services	is	physical	and	requires	direct	interaction.	The
former	we	call	‘online	labour	markets’	and	are	potentially	global,	whereas	the	latter	we	call	‘mobile	labour
markets’	and	are	by	definition	localised.	Adding	the	level	of	skills	entailed	in	the	work	we	have	the	typology
depicted	below.
Figure	1	–	Typology	of	digital	labour	markets
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Digital	labour	markets	can	have	a	number	of	potentially	positive	and	negative	effects.	They	can	increase	the	pool
of	employers	and	workers	by	removing	barriers	and	reducing	transaction	costs,	improving	matching,	increasing
human	capital	specialisation,	with	potential	net	welfare	effects	such	as	more	efficient	labour	markets	and
increased	employment.
On	the	other	hand,	bias,	frictions	and	mismatches	could	counter	any	of	the	above-mentioned	positive	effects.
Furthermore,	as	they	create	precarious	forms	of	employment,	they	could	also	be	the	source	of	social	risks	and
costs.	In	spite	of	emerging	indications,	the	evidence	is	limited	and	inconclusive	with	respect	to	these	effects.
Nonetheless	a	number	of	facts	can	be	drawn	that	also	debunk	some	of	the	hype	and	rhetoric.
Fact	1:	It’s	not	about	‘pin	money’
Workers	in	digital	labour	markets	do	not	work	for	‘pin	money’	or	out	of	boredom,	as	there	are	fairly	large	shares	of
individuals	for	whom	earnings	from	working	in	such	markets	represent	their	primary	source	of	income	and/or	who
engage	in	a	portfolio	of	several	activities.	The	idea	of	flexers	earning	extra-money	for	fun	or	for	increased
autonomy	is	just	a	myth.
Workers	in	digital	labour	markets	tend	to	be	younger	and	better	educated	than	their	population	of	reference,	but
the	predominance	of	students	is	also	just	a	myth.	Overall,	women	are	either	more	represented	than	men	or
equally	represented,	although	gender	stereotypes	penalise	them	even	in	such	an	anonymous	context	as	digital
labour	markets.
Fact	2:	Frictions,	hiring	inefficiency	and	biases
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Contrary	to	the	hyped	rhetoric	of	a	flat	worldwide	online	meritocracy	and	despite	the	sophisticated	algorithms
used,	these	digital	labour	markets	still	present	some	clear	frictions,	hiring	inefficiency,	and	biases	of	an	ethnic
and/or	gender	nature.	Controlling	for	all	other	conditions	(age,	educational	level,	experience),	contractors	from
certain	countries	tend	to	be	hired	more	frequently	for	certain	types	of	jobs.
Also	all	other	things	being	equal,	women	are	less	likely	to	receive	stereotypically	‘male	jobs’	(i.e.	engineering
tasks).	This	means	that,	despite	advancement	in	technology,	information	overload	leads	employers	to	still	rely	on
heuristics	and	biases	when	hiring	in	digital	labour	markets.
On	employment	and	related	labour	income	effects,	the	available	evidence	is	limited	and	inconclusive.	In	the
reviewed	studies	focussing	on	online	labour	markets,	examples	of	concentration	of	work	assignments	leading	to
job	concentration	and	more	income	inequality	were	found,	such	as	‘superstar’	effects,	that	is,	top-rated	workers
getting	hired	more	often	than	others.
No	cases	were	documented,	however,	of	the	long	tail	effect	(jobs	being	spread	out	among	more	people,)	which
has	more	equalising	effects	on	both	employment	and	income	levels.	The	same	applies	to	MLMs,	multi-level
marketing	companies	such	as	Amway	and	Avon,	whose	workforce	get	paid	on	a	commission	basis.	In	one	case,
less	than	10	per	cent	of	workers	account	for	more	than	80	per	cent	of	work	completed.
Fact	3:	How	to	manage	workers’	social	protection
Workers	in	digital	labour	markets	do	not	benefit	from	any	form	of	social	protection,	insurance	or	other	benefits.
Several	class	actions	in	the	US	on	the	status	(contractors	vs.	employees)	and	on	minimum	wages	have	made	the
debate	on	possible	regulatory	intervention	more	heated,	which	is	now	starting	to	become	relevant	also	in	Europe.
It	has	been	proposed	that	an	intermediate	status	between	a	contractor	and	an	employee	(dependent	self-
employed)	be	created	and	that	digital	labour	markets	should	be	made	to	pay	at	least	a	part	of	the	traditional
bundle	of	social	protection	provisions.
This	solution,	however,	would	be	difficult	to	implement	as	it	is	not	easy	to	define	in	a	general	way	the	criteria	that
identify	a	dependent	self-employed	person.	An	alternative	proposal,	named	‘benefits	portability’,	consists	of
creating	individual	security	accounts	to	protect	workers	as	they	move	from	‘gig’	to	‘gig’.
Benefits	(wage	insurance,	health	insurance,	disability	and	injury	insurance)	should	be	designed	universally	and
not	tied	to	specific	employers.	The	final	employers	would	have	obligations	similar	to	those	that	employ	regular
workers	or	they	could	share	contributions	with	the	digital	labour	markets,	which	could	pay	half	of	them.
Policy-making	challenges
The	emergence	of	digital	labour	markets	poses	a	number	of	questions	for	policy	makers:
1.	 What	are	the	possible	implications	of	these	new	digital	labour	markets	for	employment	and	wages?	Do	they
create	new	jobs	or	simply	crowd-out	existing	ones?	Are	they	a	source	of	income	integration	for	the
underemployed	or	are	they	instead	pushing	wages	down?
2.	 Do	they	justify	regulatory	intervention?	If	yes,	in	what	areas?	(i.e.,	taxation,	liability,	insurance,	social
protection).
3.	 What	would	the	costs	of	curbing	innovation	and	loosing	on	improved	labour	market	efficiency	as	a	result	of
regulatory	intervention	be?
4.	 Are	there	risks,	in	Europe,	that	fragmentation	will	emerge	as	a	result	of	national	or	local	interventions?	And
are	there	cases	where	the	issue	of	classification	(self-employed	vs.	workers)	will	be	decided	by	the	courts	in
the	absence	of	regulation?
As	this	policy	debate	heats	up,	further	empirical	evidence	is	needed	to	at	least	partially	support	policy	makers	in
answering	some	of	the	questions	above.
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automaton	after	reconstructions	of	the	device	(1789),	Humboldt	University	pilot	natural	history	project.Wikimedia
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